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MAINTAINING THE MASSACHUSETTS 

DAMAGES CAP FOR CERTAIN 

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 

NATHAN A. OLlN* 
This article is directed at lawyers who work with or for chari­
ties in Massachusetts. Earlier this year the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court put to rest a mini-debate that had been brewing in 
the employment bar for some time: are discrimination claims 
brought against public charities pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B 
(hereinafter "chapter 151B") torts subject to the $20,000 damages 
cap of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85K? In Ayash v. Dana-Farber 
Cancer Institute, 822 N.E.2d 667 (Mass. 2005), the Supreme Judicial 
Court emphatically said "no." Accordingly, Massachusetts syna­
gogues, food pantries, and homeless shelters sued by disgruntled 
employees for discrimination may no longer seek to minimize huge 
damage awards merely because they are charities, at least insofar as 
the discrimination claims against them arise under state law. 
Does this make sense? Wasn't the $20,000 cap put in place to 
keep charities open and serving the poor, hungry, and sick? And 
haven't chapter 151B claims-since the beginning of time-always 
been viewed as torts? Moreover, must the same result be reached 
with respect to the main federal anti-discrimination in employment 
* Nathan A. Olin is an attorney working in the chambers of United States Magis­
trate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman of the District of Massachusetts and an adjunct profes­
sor of employment law, torts, litigation, and legal research and writing at Bay Path 
College. A graduate of Northeastern Law School and a former litigator at Robinson & 
Cole LLP, Mr. Olin has written and lectured on various legal topics and is proud to 
have served a number of public charities in the commonwealth. He thanks his family 
for their patience and the good people at both the Drama Studio and Trinity United 
Methodist Church for the important public interest work they perform in the greater 
Springfield area. The views expressed in this article are entirely the author's own. 
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statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e 
et seq. (hereinafter "Title VII")? 
Well, fellow do-gooders, the Supreme Judicial Court has spo­
ken and it is probably too late to put the chapter 151B genie back in 
the bottle. For better or for worse, charities sued for unlawful em­
ployment discrimination under chapter 151B should prepare to face 
the prospect of uncapped damages. A different result, however, 
can be reached with respect to Title VII claims. Public charities 
may argue that the language of Title VII fits snugly within the brim 
of the damages cap. 
Part I of this Article sets forth a brief history of section 85K, 
the state charity cap statute. Part II analyzes chapter 151B, specifi­
cally its relationship to section 85K, and culminates in a discussion 
of Ayash. Part III describes Title VII and proposes a charity­
friendly application of section 85K to this federal anti-discrimina­
tion statute. 
I. SECTION 85K 
In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, charities are under attack, 
often for good reason. Watchdog web sites are scrutinizing how 
charities spend their donations, l consumer associations are rating 
charities on a variety of scales? and the state Attorney General's 
Division of Public Charities is working to ensure the proper use and 
solicitation of charitable funds.3 Unfortunately, church sex-abuse 
scandals, the auctioning of donor lists by dubious charities, and un­
scrupulous telemarketing strategies by others have not helped the 
overall goal of philanthropy. Perhaps, then, it's unsurprising that 
the historic legal protections for charities continue to be assaulted. 
For well over a century, charities in Massachusetts, as well as 
elsewhere in the country, enjoyed complete immunity from tort lia­
bility.4 The so-called "charitable immunity doctrine" originated in 
1. See Bruce Mohl, It is Better to Give when not Being Deceived: Watchdog Web­
sites Track how Charities Spend Their Money, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 21, 2004, at L1 
(describing ,;'Charity Navigator" and "Guide star" as "charity watchdogs created by 
businessmen frustrated with the lack of reliable information available to donors"). 
2. See id. (noting that ratings established by the Better Business Bureau can be 
found at http://www.give.org while those of the American Institute of Philanthropy are 
located at http://www.charitywatch.org). 
3. The Office of Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, Division of Public 
Charities, The Attorney General's Commitment to Ensuring Proper Use of Charitable 
Funds, http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid=972 (last visited on October 14, 
2005). 
4. See Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 687 (Mass. 2005). 
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two British decisions from the first half of the nineteenth century.5 
As applied in this country, the charitable immunity doctrine was 
based on three separate theories: (1) the protection of charitable 
trust funds; (2) an implied waiver by injured persons through ac­
ceptance of a charity's benefits; and (3) public policy.6 
If you work with charities, you understand that these theories 
have resonance today as well. Charitable money is always scarce, 
particularly in Massachusetts's tight economy.7 There are also con­
troversial policies being pursued at the highest levels of government 
to encourage private, philanthropic solutions to social ills.8 
In December of 1969, however, the Supreme Judicial Court is­
sued a wake-up call.9 In a tragic wrongful death case against a not­
for-profit hospital, the court stated that while "[n]othing has been 
brought to our attention suggesting that the doctrine of charitable 
immunity is repugnant to any provision of the Constitutions of the 
United States and the Commonwealth ... it appears that only three 
or four States still adhere to the doctrine."lo "Accordingly," the 
court continued, "we take this occasion to give adequate warning 
that the next time we are squarely confronted by a legal question 
respecting the charitable immunity doctrine it is our intention to 
abolish it."l1 
The Massachusetts Legislature responded quickly to the Su­
preme Judicial Court's salvo, enacting section 85K as an "emer­
gency law" on September 16, 1971.12 In summary, the statute 
abolished the charitable immunity defense-thus placating the Su­
preme Judicial Court-but put a $20,000 damages cap on "any 
5. Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Clark & Fin 507, 8 Eng Reprint 1508 
(1846); Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Clark & Fin 894, 7 Eng Reprint 934 (1839). 
6. See Bell v. Presbytery of Boise, 421 P.2d 745 (Idaho 1966); Roland v. Catholic 
Archdiocese of Louisville, 301 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. App. 1957); see also McDonald v. Mass. 
Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876). 
7. According to the Associated Grant Makers May 2005 report, Massachusetts 
ranks forty-first in the nation in giving as a percentage of personal income. ASSOCIATED 
GRANT MAKERS, GIVING IN MASSACHUSETTS 2 (May 2005), available at http:// 
www.agmconnect.org/givingreport.pdf (last visited October 14, 2005). 
8. For example, President George W. Bush continues to push a variety of faith­
based and community initiatives. See White House Office of Faith-Based and Commu­
nity Initiatives, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci (last visited 
October 14, 2005). 
9. Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Mass. 1969). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. Two decades later, the Supreme Judicial Court softened its language, not­
ing that Colby actually "suggested that the doctrine of charitable immunity is constitu­
tional." English v. New Eng. Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 1989). 
12. 1971 Mass. Acts 674. 
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cause of action based on tort" where "the tort was committed in the 
course of any activity carried on to accomplish directly the charita­
ble purposes of" a charitable organization.13 
Is the cap too low? Perhaps. Should the definition of "char­
ity" be modified, for example, to remove insured hospitals from its 
scope?14 Maybe. Just as there are strong justifications for the cap, 
there are also persuasive policy reasons for its abolition. IS None­
theless, section 85K exists-unless and until it gets amended or re­
pealed by the Legislature -and it remains the duty of the courts, as 
with any statute, to interpret its terms. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has had a number of occasions to 
interpret section 85K, most recently in Ayash.16 In 1989, the En­
glish court found the cap to be constitutional,17 In so holding, the 
court noted that the "clearly legitimate" objective of section 85K "is 
to protect the funds of charitable institutions so they may be de­
voted to charitable purposes."18 "If a charity's property were 'de­
pleted by the payment of damages,''' the Supreme Judicial Court 
continued, "'its usefulness might be either impaired or wholly de­
stroyed, the object of the founder or donors defeated, and charita­
13. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2005). The first paragraph of the statute 
provides: 
It shall not constitute a defense to any cause of action based on tort brought 
against a corporation, trustees of a trust, or members of an association that 
said corporation, trust, or association is or at the time the cause of action arose 
was a charity; provided, that if the tort was committed in the course of any 
activity carried on to accomplish directly the charitable purposes of such cor­
poration, trust, or association, liability in any such cause of action shall not 
exceed the sum of twenty thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs. Not­
withstanding any other provision of this section, the liability of charitable cor­
porations, the trustees of charitable trusts, and the members of charitable 
associations shall not be subject to the limitations set forth in this section if the 
tort was committed in the course of activities primarily commercial in charac­
ter even though carried on to obtain revenue to be used for charitable 
purposes. 
Id. In 1987, a second paragraph was added exculpating directors, officers and trustees 
of charitable educational institutions from individual liability (except for motor vehicle 
incidents) so long as "such person was acting in good faith and within the scope of his 
official functions and duties, unless such damage or injury was caused by willful or wan­
ton misconduct." Id. (as amended by 1987 Mass. Acts 508). 
14. A Westlaw search conducted on October 14, 2005 revealed that hospitals or 
health centers were defendants in approximately one-half of the reported and unre­
ported state decisions addressing section 85K over the past thirty-five years. 
15. See Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E. 2d 407 (Mass. 1969). 
16. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E. 2d 667 (Mass. 2005). 
17. English v. New Eng. Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 1989). 
18. Id. at 333. 
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ble gifts discouraged."'19 Subsequent decisions have tackled the 
question of what constitutes a "charity,"20 and have determined 
that the cap does not apply where a compensated officer of the 
charity is a defendant,21 and held that the cap may not be stricken 
as a discovery sanction.22 For more than three decades, however, 
the cap has survived intact. 
Even so, the Supreme Judicial Court has recently demon­
strated a desire to dissociate the cap from statutory causes of action. 
For example, in 1997, the court held that the cap did not apply to 
damages awarded under Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 93A (hereinafter 
"chapter 93A"), the state's consumer protection act, "because that 
statute created 'broad new rights, forbidding conduct not previously 
unlawful under the common law of contract and tort or under any 
prior statute.' "23 Similarly, in 1998, the court held that section 85K 
did not apply to a claim that a charity violated the state wiretapping 
statute.24 In so doing, the court applied the same reasoning as in 
the chapter 93A case.2S 
Of course, section 85K never mentions an exception for stat­
ute-based causes of action; as described, the cap applies to "any 
cause of action based on tort."26 Moreover, it is clear that many 
tort claims arise pursuant to statute, for example, claims under the 
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act ("MTCA")27 or the Federal Em­
ployers' Liability Act (hereinafter "FELA").28 Yet the Supreme 
Judicial Court felt compelled to put on the brakes-at least with 
regard to chapter 93A and wiretap act claims-and now with regard 
to chapter 151B discrimination claims. 
19. Id. (quoting St. Clair v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 521 N.E. 2d 1044 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1988». 
20. Connors v. Northeast Hosp. Corp., 789 N.E.2d 129, 133-35 (Mass. 2003); 
Harlow v. Chin, 545 N.E.2d 602, 613 (Mass. 1989). 
21. Mullins v. Pine Manor Coli., 449 N.E.2d 331,341-42 (Mass. 1983). 
22. Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc., 786 N.E.2d 824, 836 (Mass. 2003). 
23. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E. 2d 667, 687 (Mass. 2005) (quot­
ing Linkage Corp. v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 679 N.E.2d 191, 209 (Mass. 1997». 
24. See id. (citing BirbigJia v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 692 N.E.2d 9, 15 (Mass. 
1998». 
25. See id. 
26. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (emphasis added). 
27. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (2005). 
28. 45 US.c. §§ 51-60 (2005). 
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II. CHAPTER 151B 
A. Chapter 151B in a Nutshell 
In 1946, a full quarter-century prior to the passage of section 
85K, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted chapter 151B.29 As 
originally passed, section 1 of the statute provided that "[t]he right 
to work without discrimination because of race, color, religious 
creed, national origin or ancestry is hereby declared to be a right 
and privilege of the inhabitants of the commonwealth."30 Over the 
past six decades, the Legislature has tinkered with various provi­
sions,3! but the "clear purpose" of the statute remains "to imple­
ment the right to equal treatment guaranteed to all citizens."32 
When initially passed, chapter 151B was not as earth-shattering 
as one might imagine since a number of employee-friendly common 
law causes of actions already existed. "The statute broadens ex­
isting remedies," the Supreme Judicial Court stated in 1982.33 Or, 
in the words of the Massachusetts Appeals Court, "[l]ong before 
the passage of" chapter 151B, disgruntled employees could sue 
their employers under a variety of tort-based theories, including for 
example "the common law tort of interference with an advanta­
geous relationship."34 In fact, as recently as April 2005, the Ap­
peals Court continued to look to the common law in order to 
interpret provisions of chapter 151B.35 The Supreme Judicial 
Court, too, recently reaffirmed chapter 151B's tort roots in 
Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination.36 
29. 1946 Mass. Acts 372. 
30. 1946 Mass. Acts 372, § 1. 
31. The main operative provision of chapter 151B, section 4, has been amended, 
on average, about once per year since 1946. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 
(West 2004) (historical and statutory notes). 
32. Katz v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 312 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Mass. 
1974). 
33. Corney v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 817 (Mass. 1982). 
34. Melley v. Gillette Corp., 475 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); see 
Note, The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARV. L. Rev. 1993, 
1993 (1989) (noting that "the common law has long embraced a principle of antidis­
crimination that requires that parties engaged in public callings-so-called 'public ser­
vice companies'-serve the general public on a nondiscriminatory basis"). 
35. See Lowery v. Klemm, 825 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (holding 
that a volunteer is not an "employee" under traditional common law standards and thus 
cannot invoke chapter 151B); see also Marc D. Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of 
Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L. QUAR. 65 (1985) (suggesting recognition of 
employment discrimination claims as extensions of the common law). 
36. 808 N.E.2d 205, 214 (Mass. 2004) ("Independent research indicates that, from 
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As presently configured, chapter 151B prohibits a variety of 
employment acts.37 Primarily, section 4 of the statute provides that 
it shall be an "unlawful practice" for an employer "to refuse to hire 
or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment" any individ­
ual "because of the race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, 
[or] sexual orientation" of that individual.38 The statute also pro­
tects certain older workers39 and handicapped employees40 by mak­
ing it unlawful "[f]or any person to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or 
interfere with another person in the exercise or enjoyment of any 
right granted or protected by chapter 151B,"41 and requires em­
ployers to maintain policies against sexual harassment.42 It also 
guards against unlawful retaliation by employers,43 the discrimina­
tion provision at issue in Ayash. 
The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (here­
inafter "MCAD") is charged with "formulat[ing] policies to effectu­
ate the purposes of [chapter 151B]."44 In addition, the statute 
establishes a comprehensive scheme, bolstered by MCAD regula­
tions, for administrative procedures and, as necessary, judicial re­
view.45 Finally, chapter 151B states that its provisions are to "be 
construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes."46 
Most cases construing chapter 151B have concerned current 
employees (as well as former and prospective employees) alleging 
discrimination or retaliation by employers due to their status as 
members of a protected class. A typical scenario is this. An em­
ployee, sayan African-American woman, is fired from her job-for 
our purposes, we will assume her job was at a food pantry-shortly 
after she complains of either sexual or racial harassment. Although 
the food pantry proffers a "legitimate business reason" for the ter­
mination, the employee senses pretext and thus brings an adminis­
the late 1700's until midway through the 1800's, common law in both England and the 
American States provided for an employee's cause of action against an employer for 
wrongful discharge or breach of employment contract." (citing Feinman, The Develop­
ment of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HrsT. 118, 118 (1976»). 
37. See generally Douglas A. Randall & Douglas E. Franklin, 18 Mass. Prac. § 281 
(2005). 
38. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 15lB, § 4(1) (2005). 
39. Id. § 4(lB). 
40. Id. § 4(16). 
41. Id. § 4(4A). 
42. Id. § 3A. 
43. [d. § 4(4). 
44. [d. §§ 2, 3. 
45. See id. §§ 5-9. 
46. Id. § 9. 
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trative complaint to the MCAD. There she may receive a "right to 
sue" letter. Accordingly, she files a complaint in court in which she 
alleges that the food pantry's actions in firing her violated chapter 
151B and/or Title VII. Discovery proceeds and either the parties 
settle, the employer moves for summary judgment, or the case is 
marked up for trial. Common law claims such as defamation or 
negligent infliction of emotional distress are likely asserted as well. 
What relief might our hypothetical plaintiff seek? According 
to chapter 151B, she is entitled to "damages or injunctive relief."47 
Most plaintiffs seek damages. "Compensatory damages may in­
clude those that make [the plaintiff] whole, ... 'including those 
which are the natural and probable consequences ... of the illegal 
conduct.' "48 Typically, these involve back pay, front pay, lost bene­
fits, emotional distress damages, attorneys fees, and court costS.49 
Punitive damages may also be awarded "where [the employer's] 
conduct warrants condemnation and deterrence."5o If section 85K 
applies, however, the plaintiff's damages would be capped at 
$20,000. If not, her damages could easily swell to hundreds of 
thousands, if not millions, of dollars.51 
Of course, there are clear policy reasons to hold the food pan­
try liable for one hundred percent of the damages it caused our 
hypothetical plaintiff. However, it is equally clear that there are 
countervailing policy reasons favoring the food pantry, not the least 
of which is the protection of its limited resources. In addition, and 
perhaps more to the point, the court should not make policy deci­
sions by torturing section 85K's text. 
B. 	 Pre-Ayash Cases Construing Section 85K's Relationship to 
Chapter 151B 
As described above, section 85K applies to "any cause of ac­
tion based on tort" where "the tort was committed in the course of 
47. 	 Id. 
48. Blockel v. J.e. Penney Co., 337 F.3d 17,27 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Conway v. 
Electro Switch Corp., 523 N.E.2d 255, 257 (Mass. 1988» (alterations in original). 
49. See Conway, 523 N.E.2d at 256; Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 211 F. Supp. 
2d 291 (D. Mass. 2002), rev'd, 77 Fed. Appx. 24 (1st Cir. 2003); Gasior v. Mass. Gen. 
Hosp., No. 20012772H, 2005 WL 1367182, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 2005). 
50. 	 Blockel, 337 F.3d at 28. 
51. In one particular employment discrimination case, a jury awarded over one 
million dollars in damages, a figure that was later reduced to the still hefty sum of 
$582,225. Horney, 77 Fed. Appx. at 24; see Verdict and Settlement Summary, Edwards 
v. Mass. Bay Transit Auth., JVR No. 802-380, 2001 WL 910047 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 
2001) (reporting chapter 151B plaintiff's verdict of $7,602,999). 
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any activity carried on to accomplish directly the charitable pur­
poses of" the charitable organization. 52 In our hypothetical, we will 
assume that the firing of the food pantry worker occurred while the 
employer was directly pursuing its "charitable purposes." The sec­
tion 85K question for the hypothetical court, therefore, is whether 
the discriminatory retaliation committed by the employer was a 
"cause of action based on tort."53 
Prior to Ayash, the charity would have had a fighting chance of 
coming within the cap. Granted, the Supreme Judicial Court had 
occasionally "distinguished [chapter 151B] discrimination actions 
from tort actions. "54 Still, the court had also conceded that it "re­
ferred frequently to tort-like aspects of claims of discrimination 
under . . . [chapter] 151B."55 For example, in Conway v. Electro 
Switch Corp., the court held that lost "front pay" was compensable 
in a chapter 151B action insofar as such a remedy had been "tradi­
tionally allowed, as an element of tort damages."56 Similarly, in 
Dalis v. Buyer Advertising, Inc., the court held that discrimination 
plaintiffs, like all other tort victims, have a constitutional right to a 
jury trial,57 In so holding, the court found chapter 151B claims to 
be "analogous" to common law tort claims, particularly to "ac­
tion[s] for defamation or intentional infliction of mental distress. "58 
Despite these pro-charity messages emanating from the Su­
preme Judicial Court, several trial court decisions opined, without 
any real discussion, that chapter 151B claims would not be recog­
nized as "torts" for purposes of the charitable damages cap.59 Such 
a result was also foreshadowed by the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the First Circuit. In McMillan v. Massachusetts Society for 
52. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2005) (emphasis added). 
53. Id. 
54. Thomas v. EDI Specialists, Inc., 773 N.E.2d, 415, 418 (Mass. 2002) (refusing 
to recognize chapter 151H contribution action by employer); see also Stone hill Coll. v. 
Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205, 215 (Mass. 2004) (noting that 
"we have, on many occasions, identified tort-like aspects of a ... discrimination claim," 
but that "a violation of G. L. c. 151H is not a tort"); Jancey v. Sch. Comm. of Everett, 
658 N.E.2d 162, 173 (Mass. 1995) ("[A]cts of discrimination-whether intentional or 
unintentional-do not thereby become torts. "). 
55. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 688 (2005). 
56. 523 N. E. 2d 255, 257 (Mass. 1988) (citing, inter alia, Mitchell v. Walton Lunch 
Co., 25 N.E.2d 151 (Mass. 1940». 
57. 636 N. E. 2d 212, 214 (Mass. 1994). 
58. Id. (citations omitted). 
59. See, e.g., McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 168 
F.R.D. 94, 96-97 (D. Mass. 1995), affd, 140 F.3d 288 (1998); Walsh v. Carney Hosp. 
Corp., No. 94-2583, 1998 WL 1470698, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 10, 1998) (citing, 
inter alia, Forti v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., No. 92-3948 (Middlesex Sup. Ct. June 5, 1996». 
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Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit concluded that the MSPCA's liability on a chapter 151B 
claim was not limited by section 85K's damage cap.60 The Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit stated, "Like chapter 93A, chapter 
151B creates rights that did not exist under the common law; the 
causes of action to which it gives rise thus cannot properly be called 
causes of action in tort."61 "Accordingly," the court continued, "we 
hold that the damages award to [the plaintiff] pursuant to chapter 
151B is not subject to the constraints of [section 85K]."62 
Somewhat curiously, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
reached this decision-and thus dramatically changed the state-law 
landscape-without certifying the question to the Supreme Judicial 
Court63 or, as it had done with other controversial state-law mat­
ters, avoiding the issue altogether.64 Moreover, it was obviously the 
Supreme Judicial Court's voice that mattered, not that of the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit. In addition, there remained the 
argument that chapter 151B need not be a "tort" to be constrained 
by section 85K, only that it be "any cause of action based on tor1."65 
That nuance had not (and apparently has still not) been explored by 
any court. Even so, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's 
McMillan decision was a rifle shot across Massachusetts's charitable 
landscape. 
C. 	 Ayash Holds that Chapter 151B Retaliation Claims Against 
Charities are not Subject to the Damages Cap. 
Interesting as the pre-Ayash debate might have been, the hold­
ing in Ayash is clear: "[Section] 85K does not apply to limit dam­
ages awarded pursuant to a successful claim of unlawful retaliation 
under [chapter] 151B."66 However, this does not mean that Ayash 
was properly decided. 
The facts in Ayash are gut-wrenching. In November 1994, a 
research fellow at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, a public char­
ity for section 85K purposes, "accidentally ordered four-fold over­
60. McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 
307 (1st Cir. 1998). 
61. 	 Id. (citation omitted). 
62. 	 Id. 
63. 	 See MASS. R. SUP. J. CT. 1:03. 
64. See Martel v. Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1247 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing that 
federal courts should not "steer state law into unprecedented configurations"). 
65. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2005). 
66. 	 Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 687 (Mass. 2005). 
21 2005] IN DEFENSE OF CHARITIES 
doses of ... a powerful chemotherapy drug with well known heart 
toxicity for two patients in an experimental [breast cancer] proto­
col. "67 Both patients suffered almost immediate adverse reactions. 
One patient died. The other patient lived, but experienced severe 
cardiac damage.68 Perhaps because the deceased victim was a Bos­
ton Globe health columnist, there was intense media scrutiny and a 
number of investigations.69 Ultimately, fingers were pointed at Dr. 
Lois Ayash, the protocol chair and principal investigator, resulting 
in the hospital taking disciplinary actions against her.70 Most nota­
bly, Dr. Ayash was fired shortly after she sued the hospital in state 
courU1 Accordingly, she thereafter amended her complaint to in­
clude a claim against the hospital for unlawful retaliation in viola­
tion of chapter 151B.72 
After a five week trial, the jury found the hospital liable, 
among other common law claims, for discriminatory retaliation in 
violation of chapter 151B.73 The jury awarded Dr. Ayash over $1.2 
million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages and almost 
$400,000 in attorney's fees and costS.74 The trial judge, however, 
agreed with the hospital that section 85K's cap applied and, accord­
ingly, entered an amended judgment allowing the plaintiff to re­
cover only $20,000 in damages.75 Dr. Ayash appealed, and, on 
October 6, 2004, the Supreme Judicial Court heard oral argument. 
The court issued its decision on February 5, 2005. According to the 
Supreme Judicial Court, the cap did not apply.76 
Curiously, the majority of the Supreme Judicial Court's forty­
one page decision dealt with issues other than the charitable cap, 
for example, Dana-Farber's cross appeal and appeals by the hospi­
tal administrator (who was found liable for damages of $840,000), 
the Globe Newspaper Company (which was found liable for dam­
ages of $1,680,000), and a reporter (who was found liable for dam­
ages of $420,000).77 A few paragraphs, however, were devoted to 
67. Id. at 675. 
68. Id. at 676. 
69. Id. at 673. 
70. Id. at 675-80. 
71. Id. at 680-81. 
72. /d. at 681. 
73. Id. at 674. 
74. Id. at 674 n.5. 
75. Id. at 674-75. 
76. Id. at 687-88. 
77. Id. at 674. 
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the hospital's arguments with respect to section 85K's cap.78 The 
court rejected those arguments. 
First, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the Court of Ap­
peals for the First Circuit in McMillan, that chapter 151B, like chap­
ter 93A, created rights that did not exist under the common law 
and, ergo, chapter 151B claims should not be considered torts for 
purposes of section 85K.79 There are several problems with this 
conclusion. For one, the Supreme Judicial Court apparently ig­
nored its previous pronouncements that chapter 151B broadened 
the existing common law tort remedies.80 The court also seemed to 
have conflated the term "torts"81 with the actual language used in 
chapter 85K: "any cause of action based on tor1."82 Surely a cause 
of action can be "based on tort" without being a complete "tort" in 
and of itself. Indeed, that was the very distinction the court drew in 
Stonehill College (and again in Ayash) when it stated that chapter 
151B claims of discrimination contain "tort-like aspects."83 
Second, the court noted that section 85K is limited to circum­
stances where the cause of action is "committed in the course of any 
activity carried on to accomplish directly [a defendant's] charitable 
purposes."84 But clearly, the hospital thought it was acting for the 
good of the charity when it discriminated against the plaintiff. It 
was insulating itself against patient lawsuits and bad pUblicity. 
Moreover, as the court itself recognized, just because the plaintiff's 
circumstances may be "compelling" does not mean that the "chari­
table purpose" limitation should not apply.85 "The purpose behind 
the charitable cap," the court acknowledged, "was 'to protect the 
funds [and other assets] of charitable institutions so they may be 
devoted to charitable purposes.' "86 
Third, the Supreme Judicial Court looked to chapter 151B's 
legislative history. As the Supreme Judicial Court pointed out, 
78. Id. at 687-88. 
79. Id. at 687. ' 
80. Corney v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 817 (Mass. 1982); see supra text accompanying 
note 33. 
81. Ayash, 822 N.E.2d at 687; see id. at 687 n.20 (citing Jancey v. Sch. Comm. of 
Everett, 658 N.E.2d 162, 173 (Mass. 1995) for the proposition that "acts of discrimina­
tion ... do not thereby become torts"). 
82. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2005). 
83. Ayash, 822 N.E.2d at 688 (citing Stonehill Coli. v. Mass. Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205, 215 (Mass. 2004». 
84. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2005». 
85. Id. 
86. /d. at 687-88 (quoting English v. New Eng. Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 
333 (Mass. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990» (alteration in original). 
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charitable and religious organizations were initially exempted from 
the definition of "employers" subject to chapter 151B liability.87 
Noting that the exemption was lifted in 1969, the Supreme Judicial 
Court concluded that the Legislature desired to make charities 
"subject to the same provisions and remedies as other employers 
for claims brought under" chapter 151B.88 In a general sense, that 
was probably true.89 But it appears more likely that, in 1969, the 
legislature was focused on the insular problems surrounding the 
regulation of religious institutions, i.e., free exercise challenges. In­
deed, the amendment was linked to another one that specified that 
such organizations could still discriminate on the basis of religion.90 
In short, there appears to have been absolutely no indication that 
the legislature, in 1969, was seeking to rewrite the definition of 
"torts" or causes of action "based on tort." 
Regardless of whether Ayash properly interpreted the court's 
own precedent, its conclusion as to the relationship between chap­
ter 151B and section 85K was pellucid. "A fair reading of both stat­
utes," the court stated in no uncertain terms, "does not support the 
extension of the charitable cap to damages awarded for successful 
claims under [chapter] 151B."91 Interestingly, however, neither 
Ayash nor any of the cases upon which it was based (most notably 
McMillan) said anything about chapter 151B's federal analogue, Ti­
tle VII. Accordingly, there may still be room for charities con­
fronted with employment discrimination claims to maintain the 
protection of the damages cap. 
III. TITLE VII 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed on July 2, 1964, less 
than one year after the assassination of President John F. Ken­
nedy.92 The bill had been originally submitted by the late President 
as a way to remedy the racial segregation of African Americans in 
many facets of daily life.93 Regarding employment, however, the 
87. Id. at 688. 
88. Id. 
89. See generally Note, The Operation of State Fair Employment Practices Com­
missions, 68 HARV. L. REV. 685, 687 (1955). 
90. See 1969 Mass. Acts 115. 
91. Ayash, 822 N.E.2d at 688. 
92. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
93. For example, Title I concerned voting rights and Title II dealt with accommo­
dation at public places. See generally DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT 
LAW: TEXT AND CASES 387-466 (South-Western CollegelWest 12th ed. 2004) (describ­
ing history of Title VII). 
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Act was quite broad, going beyond race-based discrimination. Title 
VII of the Act made it an "unlawful employment practice" to dis­
criminate against any individual with regard to his or her "race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin."94 Like chapter 151B, Title 
VII also prohibited retaliation against any individual because he or 
she opposed a discriminatory employment practice or engaged in 
other protected conduct.95 In addition, again similar to chapter 
151B, Title VII contained comprehensive prelitigation administra­
tive requirements.96 All of these provisions still exist today. 
A main purpose of Title VII is to make victims of unlawful 
employment discrimination whole.97 As initially enacted, however, 
the only available remedies were injunctive relief and reinstate­
ment, with or without back pay.98 Noting this inequity, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to allow the recovery of a 
broad range of compensatory and punitive damages,99 and to give 
plaintiffs the right to a jury trial.1°O Even before those amend­
ments, however, several circuit courts had already considered dis­
crimination suits under federal law as analogous to tort actions 
seeking to redress personal injuries.1ol Indeed, as early as 1978, the 
Supreme Court itself had deemed "distress"-a main component of 
Title VII damages-to be a tort-based "personal injury."102 
The particular issue of whether Title VII claims could be con­
sidered "torts" came to a head in the Court's 1992 decision in 
United States v. Burke .103 In Burke, the Court was confronted with 
the question whether a Title VII settlement payment could be ex­
cluded from taxable income as "damages received ... on account of 
personal injuries."104 That question turned on another: whether Ti­
tle VII injuries and claims were "personal and tort-like in na­
94. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
95. Id. § 2000e-3(a). 
96. See CHARLES R. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS §§ 1:69-1:97 (West 1997-2004). 
97. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). 
98. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g)(1). 
99. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 402(a), 10:; Stat. 1099 (1991). 
100. 42 u.s.c. § 1981a(c). 
101. See, e.g., Rickel v. Comm'r., 900 F.2d 655, 663 (3d Cir. 1990) (deeming dis­
crimination claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act, a companion statute 
to Title VII, to be akin to a tort action); Pistillo v. Comm'r., 912 F.2d 145, 148 (6th Cir. 
1990) (similar). 
102. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263 (1978). 
103. 504 U.S. 229 (1992). 
104. Id. at 230. 
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ture."105 The Court said "no"-Title VII claims were not 
necessarily tort-like-but, and this is important, only insofar as the 
statute existed prior to the 1991 amendments.106 The amendments 
which made compensatory and punitive damages recoverable, the 
Court continued, "signal[ed] a marked change in [Congress'] con­
ception of the injury redressable by Title VII."107 
For example, the Court observed, "A 'tort' has been defined 
broadly as a 'civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which 
the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for dam­
ages.' "108 Title VII claims, as amended, fit that definition nicely. In 
addition, the Court continued, torts make available "a broad range 
of damages to compensate [a] plaintiff 'fairly for injuries caused by 
the violation of his [ or her] legal rights.' "109 Again, the amended 
version of Title VII comports fully with that definition. 
True, the Burke Court went on to opine that Title VII, as origi­
nally enacted, did not allow awards for compensatory or punitive 
damages and, thus, it would have been difficult, under the original 
language, to have deemed a Title VII cause of action a "tort."110 
However, the "marked change" signified by the 1991 amendments 
would appear to put to rest any doubt that Title VII discrimination 
claims are "torts."111 Today, just like other tort litigants, Title VII 
plaintiffs can seek "compensatory damages for 'future pecuniary 
losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, 
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses,' as well as 
punitive damages."1l2 They also have the right to a jury trial.113 
Since Burke, the trend in Title VII jurisprudence has indeed 
been to view post-amendment Title VII actions as akin to common 
law tort claims.114 As one court put it, where a Title VII award 
105. Id. at 232 (quoting Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121 (6th Cir. 
1991». 
106. See id. at 233-42. 
107. Id. at 241 n.12. 
108. Id. at 234 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON 
& DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (5th ed. 1984». 
109. Id. at 235 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978». 
110. See id. at 237-42. 
111. Id. at 241 n.12. 
112. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000». 
113. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(c) (2005). 
114. See, e.g., Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., No. C-88-1467 MHP, 1993 WL 
557652, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 1993); King v. Webb (In re Webb), 214 B.R. 553, 
557-58 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); see also Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1220 
n.18 (3d Cir. 1995) (observing that the 1991 amendments which allow recovery of com­
pensatory and punitive damages "throw doubt on the continued validity of the Burke 
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compensates "traditional tort-like harms," it ought to be viewed 
under the tort umbrella.11s Commentators have also considered Ti­
tle VII discrimination suits to be a species of tort law.116 
What does all of this have to do with Massachusetts's damages 
cap? Put simply, a legitimate argument can be made that the cap 
(deemed inapplicable to chapter 151B discrimination claims) can 
still be applied to claims brought under Title VII. Given Burke and 
its progeny, it seems clear that most Title VII discrimination claims, 
particularly those seeking compensatory and/or punitive damages, 
are torts. At the very least, it would appear that Title VII claims 
are causes of action "based on tort," as that phrase is liberally used 
in section 85K. Accordingly, Massachusetts charities, although they 
may have lost the chapter 151B battie, can still argue that their 
damages for successful Title VII discrimination claims should be 
capped at $20,000. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Did the Supreme Judicial Court in Ayash misinterpret section 
85K when it held that chapter 151B discrimination claims are not 
causes of action "based on tort"? Or worse, did the court engraft 
new language onto the damages cap?117 Perhaps-but that chapter 
is now closed. Charities that are sued for employment discrimina­
holding"); Drase v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 1077,1079 n.l (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting 
that "Burke may not apply to Title VII actions filed after the 1991 changes to the Civil 
Rights Act"). Of course, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has deemed the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 not "tort-like" because its monetary 
remedies "are limited to back wages, which are clearly of an 'economic character,' and 
liquidated damages, which ... serve no compensatory function." Comm'r. v. Schleier, 
515 U.S. 323, 336 (1995). Title VII, as indicated, is not so constrained. 
115. In re Webb, 214 B.R. at 558. 
116. See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment As a Tort: Why Title Vll Hostile 
Environment Liability Should be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375 (1998); Juanita Wil­
liams, Comment, Title Vll Discrimination (The Dignitary Tort): Is it Personal?, 18 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 263 (1993). 
117. Clearly, the Supreme Judicial Court recognizes that the "time tested wisdom 
of the separation of powers" requires courts "to avoid judicial legislation in the guise of 
new constructions to meet real or supposed new popular viewpoints, preserving always 
to the Legislature alone its proper prerogative of adjusting the statutes to changed con­
ditions." Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (Mass. 1996) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 334 N.E.2d 617 (Mass. 1975» (citation and in­
ternal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed this principle 
less than one week after its decision in Ayash. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 
N.E.2d 1134, 1161 (Mass. 2005) ("Th[e] principles [of separation of powers] call for the 
judiciary to refrain from intruding into the power and function of another branch of 
government ....") (quoting LIMITS v. President of the Senate, 604 N.E.2d 1307 (Mass. 
1992» (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tion under state law can no longer seek refuge in section 85K. The 
question of whether the cap applies to Title VII discrimination 
claims, however, may be another story. 
